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 When considering an international human rights policy, a functional definition of 
human rights is necessary.  Definitions will facilitate or limit consensus of sovereigns. 
Lack of consensus compels further investigation, inquiry, and debate. Whether an event 
has violated human rights must be established. Recognized consensus on the definition of 
human rights allows for more immediate consideration of ethical and moral implications 
of action or inaction; determinations of how to do good and avoid evil. Whether an event 
has violated human rights becomes per se. In theory and logic, recognized consensus 
allows for expedited determinations by sovereigns regarding need for intervention and 
form of intervention (e.g. economic sanction, military response).  Although relative 
responsibility of sovereigns, such as the response of the United States versus the response 
of Ghana to international crisis, may require additional political determinations, the 
primacy of action is not lost.   
 In this paper, I will critique Jack Donnelly’s emphasis on positive rights in 
formulating a comprehensive doctrine of human rights. This critique forms the thesis of a 
negative rights approach as most essential to the definition of human rights in limiting 
future genocide or atrocity assuming a pluralistic society.  By defining human rights 
within the context of negative rights, greater consensus is possible among and between 
sovereigns allowing prompt action and greater protection of human life. This quasi-statist 
position will be defended employing supporting philosophies of Thomas Hobbes, 
Maurice Cranston, John Rawls, Thomas Nagel, and Joshua Cohen. Following the 
establishment of negative rights as most essential to a functional human rights policy, this 
paper explores how best to define these specific negative rights.  More simply, what 
rights are to be protected as negative rights? This paper argues natural rights theory as the 
best approach to preserving fundamental rights of all citizens and society.  Moral right, 
specifically a right to life, is then delineated and discussed as a central element within the 
natural rights theory. This argument is defended through analysis of works of Jacques 
Maritain, Thomas Fay, Ralph McInerny, H.L.A. Hart, James Schall, Raymond Dennehy,  
and E.B.F. Midgely. 
 Critique of Donnelly 
 
When considering rights, a common philosophical distinction exists between 
positive rights and negative rights. There is a qualitative difference between these types 
of rights when viewed from the perspective of the individual. Positive rights commonly 
refer to participatory rights of citizens.  An example of an American positive right is the 
right to education.  Examples of positive rights often challenged by American and British 
conservatives include the right to food, healthcare, or housing.  These positive rights 
require more than mere recognition and compliance by others but active participation. 
Jack Donnelly holds these positive rights to be economic and social in nature, extending 
to even cultural rights.1 Ultimately, it is these rights which lend toward entitlements to 
socially provided goods, services, and opportunities.2 Positive rights require that others 
provide active support.  Hence, a violation of a positive right involves “only failing to 
provide assistance, a (presumably lesser) sin of omission.”3 
Conversely, negative rights commonly refer to freedoms from encroachment by 
the government or others.  They prohibit intrusion on individuals. Essentially, these 
negative rights are certain liberties which afford redress or sanction if unfairly 
encroached. In American constitutional theory, negative rights are found in many 
protections afforded by the Bill of Rights.  These include First Amendment freedoms 
such as speech and free exercise of religion. “Negative rights require only the forbearance 
of others to be realized”.4 Thereby, violation of a negative right “involves actively 
causing harm, a sin of commission”.5  
In International Human Rights, Jack Donnelly offers a modernity argument for 
the development of human rights citing massive development post-World War I with the 
Jewish Holocaust serving as the catalyst. Donnelly also refutes the qualitative difference 
                                                 
1 Donnelly, Jack, International Human Rights, Third Edition (Westview Press, 2007) at 25 
2 Ibid  
3 Ibid  
4 Donnelly, Jack, International Human Rights, Third Edition (Westview Press, 2007) at 26 
5 Ibid 
between negative and positive rights.6 Donnelly maintains that negative rights are 
essentially civil and political rights; whereas positive rights are economic and social 
rights.7 Donnelly argues all human rights “require both positive action and restraint by 
the state if they are to effectively implemented”.8 Therefore, both require endeavoring 
and forbearance.  Donnelly cites examples of the right to vote, due process, and trial by 
jury as common civil and political, or negative, rights. Furthermore, “[s]ome rights, of 
course, are relatively positive.  Others are relatively negative.  But this distinction does 
not correspond to the division between civil and political rights and economic and social 
rights.”9 Donnelly’s analysis attempts to destroy fundamental distinctions between 
positive and negative rights by analyzing the role of government in enforcing these rights. 
This perspective, however, is decided government-centric and western. A right to 
democratically elected representation is assumed as are standards of western legal 
procedure. Most notably, an expansive definition of negative rights is treated.  The 
analysis is based on government action or inaction, not the subject. It is the action, or 
restraint, of government which determines the qualitative character of the right as 
opposed to the impact on the subject.  This treatment of government as separate from the 
citizenry contradicts the basis of governmental legitimacy. The basis of legitimacy being 
development of laws by the citizenry themselves. 
By emphasizing the citizenry and limited rights, the distinction between positive 
and negative right is better applied to the study of international human rights.  It is the 
impact upon the subject, or citizen, which is the core of human rights and related 
violations.  Whatever the philosophical perspective regarding the origin of human rights 
– religious or secular – the impact upon the individual, or collection of individuals, is the 
catalyst for action by sovereigns. In limiting the purview of international human rights to 
essential negative rights agreed upon by most liberal societies (i.e. right to life), a more 
apolitical standard for human rights enforcement is possible. When these fundamental 
negative rights, or liberties, are violated by a government or citizenry the world 





community is able to react in a timely manner.  In considering the post-World War I 
context given by Donnelly, the Armenian, Jewish, Yugoslavian, Rwandan, and Sudanese 
genocides share the common characteristic of a grossly negligent response time by the 
international community.  As human life is systematically destroyed, the international 
community confers. 
Donnelly then proceeds to draw moral equivalence between violations of positive 
and negative rights.  Does it really make a moral difference if one kills someone through 
neglect or by positive action?10 The answer is yes. Neglect assumes a more expansive 
definition of duty than a positive act.  Determination of duty is based on relationships and 
is therefore political.  Determination of duty is also based on understanding of the self.  In 
a pluralist society, duty is often determined by theological perspective or personal 
philosophy.  Even assuming a common religion, the understanding of duty therein may 
differ.  The understanding of duty varies widely within segments of the major religions – 
Judaism, Islam, and Christianity – despite a fundamental recognition of some form of 
relationship between God and Man.  The secularist, humanist, agnostic, and atheist are 
similar in varying determinations of duty.  Ultimately, pluralism makes the determination 
of duty a significant obstacle. An expansive definition of duty promotes greater 
disagreement. The threshold question of how to do good and avoid evil becomes clouded. 
Alternatively, limiting the human rights question to one of response to positive 
action serves to more clearly define duty. Prohibited actions, such as the direct taking of 
life, are more easily recognized and addressed.  Political determinations by sovereigns 
regarding duty, which require time and deliberation, are also limited.  The economic and 
social model of positive rights advanced by Donnelly results in lost lives based on lack of 
consensus. A negative rights model seeking to secure a right to life is most appropriate 
based on the contemporary politics and inability to prevent genocide since the drafting of 
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Negative Rights as Most Essential 
 
 The critique of Jack Donnelly serves as the basis for a limited definition of human 
rights whereby the negative rights approach is most essential.  As a normative theory, 
placing limits on what constitutes human rights does not prohibit future growth or 
breadth of the definition.  In considering how human rights should or ought to be defined, 
we tailor definition based on realities of history and contemporary politics.  The potential 
for development toward a more liberal, progressive, or even Marxist ideal is not 
impossible.  This determination is for future analysis.  Instead, the foundation is 
established to preserve the most fundamental human right to life by recognizing the 





In considering international reaction to human rights issues, I will assume a 
Hobbesian position that international relations are a state of nature which then requires a 
realist political theory.  This position serves as the most powerful argument for 
international skepticism regarding international relations.11 Nonetheless, Hobbes 
philosophy of the state of nature being a state of war is particularly prescient given the 
current wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, continued Middle East conflict, and military 
posturing of a resurgent Russia. This state of the nature argument allows for a right of 
nature as well.  This is the right to self-sufficient being with the ability to protect oneself. 
Hobbes holds states are autonomous because people are autonomous; thereby a sovereign 
is necessary to establish justice.  Hobbes extends this analysis to the international scene.  
Internationally, a state of nature exists because there is no sovereign to establish justice.   
As a result, the response to any international humanitarian crisis requires a 
political determination by the sovereign to ensure any relief does not adversely impact 
their self-sufficiency financially or otherwise. Despite the crisis, the state of nature still 
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exists. Therefore, to preserve the most basic liberties, such as a right to life, one must 
attempt to limit the Hobbesian argument.  The state of nature assumption is best limited 
by reducing application.  This is accomplished by limiting the need for determination of 
relief through a narrow understanding of when relief is appropriate.  A traditional 
definition of human rights based on negative rights best removes Hobbes assumption.  




Cranston and Authentic Human Rights 
 
As Maurice Cranston argues in Political Theory and Rights of Man, “a 
philosophically respectable concept of human rights has been muddled, obscured, and 
debilitated in recent years by an attempt to incorporate into it specific rights of a different 
logical category”12 Contrary to Donnelly’s emphasis of positive rights, Cranston 
maintains the “traditional human rights are political and civil rights such as the right to 
life, liberty, and a fair trial”.13  These rights are contemporary negative rights requiring 
forbearance of intrusion.  Donnelly, and other modern human rights scholars, offer the 
expansive definition of human rights based on positive right theory including economic 
and social rights. Cranston responds to this redefinition of human rights with both 
philosophical and political objections.14  The philosophical objection is the new theory of 
human rights is illogical.15  The political objection is the new theory confuses human 
rights and hinders protection of more actual human rights.16 
Cranston, writing in 1967, recognizes the then recent evolution of human rights 
agreed upon by Donnelly.  Cranston notes “[t]he reason for the revival is perhaps to be 
sought in history, first, in the great twentieth century evils, Nazism, fascism, total war, 
                                                 






and racialism, which have all presented a fierce challenge human rights; and secondly, in 
an increased belief in, or demand for, equality of men.”17  Cranston analyzes the 
historical growth of rights in keeping with the positivist right approach now advocated by 
Donnelly.  This includes the positivist approach followed by Human Rights Commission 
of the United Nations Economic and Social Council in 1946.  This positivist approach 
resulted in objection by some countries, including the United State and Soviet Union.   
In 1948 the Uniform Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is drafted to include 
thirty articles.  Cranston correctly recognizes the first twenty articles as traditional 
negative rights commonly held to be natural rights, or rights of man.  However, it is the 
remaining ten articles which Donnelly’s argument would emphasize.  These remaining 
ten rights are positive rights – economic and social – including a right to education and 
“periodic holidays with pay” in Article 24 of the UDHR.18  Cranston maintains such 
economic and social rights are not human rights as they cannot be translated into political 
and legal action. More simply, such rights are virtually unenforceable.  
In response to this expansive definition of human rights, Cranston bifurcates 
rights into the categories of legal right and moral right.19 It is the specific category of 
“moral rights of all people in all situations” which he holds to be true human rights.20 
Universality begs these rights be “few” and “highly generalized”21  A limited, 
generalized understanding allows for greater agreement and further negates the politics of 
relationship.  When considered from a classical perspective, the distributive justice 
requirement of geometric or arithmetic proportionality, in recognition not response, is 
effectively removed.  The station or situation of the claimants need not be exhaustively 
considered.  In turn, the political differences of conferring sovereigns may be disregarded 
for action.   
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Cranston argues for a three-part test to determine authenticity of a human right: 
practicability; genuine universality; and paramount importance.22 Practicability relates to 
both rights and duties.  The individual cannot be charged with the impossible; nor can 
they can be guaranteed the impossible.  Genuine universality relates to the right apply to 
everyone not specific classes, groups, or demographics. Finally, paramount importance 
relies on the “utilitarian philosophy which analyses moral goodness in terms of the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number”.23 Cranston notes common sense affords an 
understanding of the essential services (i.e. ambulance) as opposed to non-essential (i.e. 
fairs and camps).24 
Maurice Cranston ultimately limits the definition of human rights to those 
traditional negative rights recognized by most countries, including freedom of movement, 
right to life, right to liberty, and right to fair trial. It is these rights whose violations serve 
as an “affront to justice”.25 These traditional negative rights also allow for consensus 
among divergent societies.  This overlapping consensus regarding human rights is 
supported by John Rawls understanding of public reason and related legal theory. 
 
 
Rawls’ Law of Peoples and Legal Theory Lexicon  
 
 The Law of Peoples by John Rawls analyzes justice by construction of the original 
position where actors choose principles of justice.26 Rawls then extends these individual 
principles of justice to nations and international law. Rawls philosophy supports the 
thesis of negative rights as most essential to human rights.  The international law and 
justice envisioned by Rawls is more limited than some contemporaries.  A positive right 
to democracy is not guaranteed.  Moral powers, including a capacity for justice and idea 
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of the good, are deemed necessary for society.27  Although Rawls assumes a pluralistic 
society, he argues liberal societies with different comprehensive doctrines, such as 
Judaism, Islam, and Christianity, may find a political element or overlapping consensus.  
This overlapping consensus then forms a public reason.28  This public reason will be 
limited which lends more favorably to a limited negative rights definition of human 
rights.  The positive rights emphasis of Donnelly will fail to establish public reason 
whereas negative rights foster greater universality.  Rawls clearly states the law of 
peoples requires “a special class of urgent rights, such as freedom from slavery and 
serfdom, liberty (but not equal liberty) of conscience, and security of ethnic groups from 
mass murder and genocide”.29 Violations of these traditional negative rights are “equally 
condemned by both reasonable liberal peoples and decent hierarchical people”.  
Therefore, the limited definition affords public reason or consensus; consensus then 
allows prompt determination of action or inaction. 
It is the principle of toleration which serves as Rawls underlying philosophy.30  
Toleration affords a more limited approach to intervention as opposed to a cosmopolitan 
position.  The toleration principle, itself, trumps a cosmopolitan position which may 
require intervention.  Rawls holds intervention is not permitted among and between 
liberal societies.  Therefore, failure to secure positive rights, social or economic, does not 
allow intervention.  In fact, Rawls precludes interventionist approach in the international 
sphere assuming basic human rights and a system of law, namely a decent hierarchical 
system of justice, exist.  Note Rawls conception of rights is once again basic and not 
expansive.  These basic rights and system of law are most similar to a traditional negative 
rights approach in coordination with Hobbes and Cranston.  Action of a sovereign is 
warranted on a limited basis contrary to cosmopolitan approach holding a country failing 
to adhere to democratic principles may be subject to sanction. 
This understanding of limited, or basic, human rights and limited intervention is 
further supported by Rawls’ legal theory lexicon. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls maintains 
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his premise of justice as fairness as being applicable to international law31.  This theory 
evolves from the same Hobbesian presumption regarding social contract theory, namely 
state of nature as a state of war.  Once again, the Rawlsian evolution derives from 
construction of the original position and veil of ignorance.  The result being two specific 
principles of distributive justice: the equal liberty principle and the difference principle.  
The equal liberty principle holds individuals have equal claim to a scheme of 
basic human rights and liberties.  This schedule of basic human rights and liberties is 
compatible with the same schedule for all others individuals.  In this scheme, only the 
equal political liberties are to be guaranteed their value.  The difference principle relates 
to social and economic inequalities.  The equal liberty is superior to the difference 
principle in cases of conflict. Therefore, to protect the interest of the worst off, 
everyone’s basic human rights, including traditional negative rights and liberties such as 
speech and due process, must first be protected. It is the equal liberty principle which 
ensures these basic rights. 
Practically speaking, Rawls lexicon prioritizes the establishment of basic human 
rights.  Once these basic human rights are satisfied, questions regarding social and 
economic inequality may be considered so long as the first principle is not sacrificed.  
This is analogous to the relationship of negative rights to positive rights.  Negative rights, 
similar to the equal liberty principle, are most essential.  Once the negative rights are 
established more complex questions relating to positive rights may be treated. For 
instance, once the right of life is established as a prohibition against genocide or ethnic 
cleansing, the positive right of a housing, food, or healthcare may be considered.  This 
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Nagel and Humanitarian Duty 
 
   In considering international human rights and global understandings of justice, 
Thomas Nagel differentiates between justice and humanitarian duty.32 This distinction 
advances the thesis of negative rights as most essential by transforming the Rawls 
philosophy into a moral position.  Only a principle of humanitarian duty is possible 
according to Nagel.  
Nagel makes a distinction between negative rights and associative rights.  The 
former relate to the international and the latter to national sovereignty.  Nagel lists among 
negative rights “those that are supposedly not dependent on a specific form of 
membership in a specific political society.  These include freedom of expression, freedom 
of religion, pre-political limits to the legitimate use of power independent of special 
forms of association. Presumably these rights are not to be associated with socio-
economic justice and can be realized voluntarily. Not so with rights of association.  These 
rights emerge only because a political society is brought together under a strong, coercive 
form of centralized control.  
Negative rights did not clearly relate to a theory of justice because actions relating 
to human rights are humanitarian duties. Associative rights are based in the Rawlsian 
approach to justice as fairness.  These are essentially social rights. Although Nagel 
categorizes actions relating to human rights as humanitarian duty, the result is no 
different than Cranston or Rawls.  The consideration is one of the moral minimum well 
grounded in a limited definition of human rights. In considering the most traditional 
negative rights of life, liberty, and security, Nagel holds “[t]he normative force of the 
most basic human rights against violence, enslavement, and coercion, and of the most 
basic humanitarian duties of rescue from immediate danger, depends on our capacity to 
put ourselves in other peoples shoes.”33  This relates to both Cranston’s genuine 
universality and Rawls’ equal liberty principle. Nagel continues, “[t]he interests protected 
by such moral requirements are so fundamental, and the burdens they impose, considered 
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statistically, so much slighter, that a criterion of universalizability of the Kantian type 
clearly supports them.”34  
Therefore, intervention by a state or institution, such as the United Nations, is not 
a matter of justice but humanitarian duty.  However, as states participation in this 
humanitarian duty is voluntary, it will also be based on a limited conception of negative 
rights or moral minimum.  A similar approach is considered by Joshua Cohen in his 
development of global public reason. 
  
 
Cohen and the Global Public Reason 
 
In The Egalitarian Conscience, Joshua Cohen offers a political argument as 
opposed to a normative theory. In the vain of Hobbes, Cranston, Rawls, and Nagel, a 
limited approach to human rights is offered.  The cosmopolitan approach calling for 
expansive positive rights, such as a right to democracy, is not advanced.  
Cohen offers an argument in line with Rawls overlapping consensus and public 
reason. “A conception of human rights is part of an ideal of global public reason: a shared 
basis for political argument that expresses a common reason that adherents of conflicting 
religious, philosophical, and ethical traditions can reasonably be expected to share.”35  
The definition of human rights must be limited to allowing this sharing.  It cannot be 
formulated by reference to particular religious or secular morality.36 
Cohen argues for this same notion of universality cited above coupled with the 
appeal to morality of Nagel.  Cohen maintains human rights have three features.  First, 
they are “universal in being owed by every political society, and owed to all 
individuals”.37  As they are owed to all individuals, Cohen maintains human rights as 
entitlements.  These entitlements of human rights then serve to ensure the qualification 
for membership.38 Furthermore, human rights may command universal assent “only as a 
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decidedly thin theory of what is right, a definition of the minimal conditions for any life 
at all.”39 Second, human rights are “requirements of political morality whose force as 
such does not depend on their expression in enforceable law.”40 Third, they are 
“especially urgent requirements of political morality”.41  These requirements allow for a 
minimalist definition when considering application.   
Cohen also recognizes specific traditional negative rights, including life and 
security, as associated with demands of basic humanity regardless of membership in an 
organized political society.42 These threshold rights, as recognized by Cranston, Rawls, 
and Nagel, must first be achieved. Cohen argues the protection of human rights as a “less 
demanding standard than assuring justice” and the related positive rights including a 
democracy43.  Cohen continues “[l]ess demanding, but let us not forget that world would 
be unimaginably different – many hundreds of millions of lives would immeasurably 
better – if this less demanding but exacting standard were ever achieved.”44 
 
   
Natural Right as Binding Principle 
 
Upon consideration of Donnelly, Hobbes, Cranston, Rawls, and Cohen, we are 
left with a compelling argument for a negative rights approach as most essential to a 
functional international human rights policy. Whether the justification resides in the 
Cranston’s three-part authenticity test, Rawls’ international law and justice, Nagel’s  
deontological argument, or Cohen’s public reason, we are charged with the establishment 
of a new standard affording functional application. This begs exploration into how best to 
define the specific human rights requiring protection as negative rights.  What is our 
standard? We must now attempt to determine whether sufficient commonality exists to 
agree upon these rights.  It is the natural rights theory emanating from natural law which 
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best serves to ensure protection of humanity as negative rights. In considering natural 
rights theory, treatment is given to two specific rights commonly held as fundamental – 
freedom and life. As evidenced by these most basic examples, the moral right recognized 
by Maurice Cranston emerges. Ultimately, it is the understanding of a natural right 




Maritain and Natural Law  
 
 One must first detail the relevance of the natural law in order to argue for natural 
right and moral right.  It is only through the natural law that the natural right, and moral 
right, can be born.  The “[n]atural law also recognizes human rights, rights that inhere in 
man simply because he is a human person.”45 Although long stipulated, the natural law 
has been recently deconstructed by modernist, postmoderns, and humanists as an artifact 
from a fading western society. Aristotelian and Thomistic understandings of the natural 
law are now more often challenged as there exists greater acceptance of laws and rights 
as conferred.46 A purely statist understanding, similar to that offered by Donnelly, has 
found traction in recent generations. 
 Nonetheless, it has long been held that “[t]he philosophical foundation of the 
Rights of man is Natural Law.”47 Jacques Maritain holds “the philosophy of the rights of 
the human person is based upon the true idea of natural law, as looked upon in an 
ontological perspective and as conveying through the essential structures and 
requirements of created being the wisdom of the Author of Being.”48 Maritain recognizes 
two distinct elements of natural law which are necessary for development of natural right 
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48 Maritain, Jacques, Man and the State, at 84 
theory; the ontological element and the gnoseological element.49 It is the ontological 
element of the natural law which is central to recognition of any natural right. Maritain 
describes this ontological element of natural law as that “to which every human person is 
gifted with intelligence and is capable of pursuing ends in a way for which he is or she is 
answerable.”50 He holds it is this nature which serves as a basis for determination of 
normal functioning of man, specifically “what man should be and do”.51 Alternatively 
stated, how man should do good and avoid evil. As a result, this ontological element 
regarding man’s nature is a moral law which is both given and ideal.52 The second 
element – gnoseological – is simply man’s ability to grasp the first ontological element.53  
Therefore, by applying Maritain, we find the grounding of human rights is based firmly 
in the natural law.54  
Maritain’s contention is also advanced by E.B.F. Midgley in his Natural Law and 
Fundamental Rights where he concludes, “fundamental human rights can be adequately 
upheld only by reference to man’s natural inclinations, to the natural law and, ultimately, 
to the eternal law itself.”55 Midgely argues in similar logic that human nature and natural 
law reveals the truth regarding the person.  It is this truth which must be recognized in 
order for an intellectual basis for human rights to be argued.56 It is this intellectual basis 
which allows for a latent life ethic within human rights philosophy.  Without this 
acceptance of a value of life, there remains little charge to establish or enforce human 
rights. 
As detailed in the analysis of negative right, it is the politicizing of the definition 
of human rights which commonly results in lack of consensus and ultimately inaction.  In 
a positive rights model, the individual is afforded more economic and social rights. This 
rights ethic stands in contrast to a negative rights approach tending to define rights more 
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54 Fay, Thomas, Maritain on Rights and Natural Law, St. John’s University at 439 
55 Midgley, E.B.F., Natural Law and Fundamental Rights, The American Journal of Jurisprudence at 144 
56 Ibid  
narrowly.  In applying Maritain, we find natural law providing a philosophic basis for a 
more balanced understanding of rights.57 This allows protection from both a divinized 
understanding of rights per Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the authoritarian state capable of 
subordinating all rights.58  
The question then becomes what natural rights are dictated, or at least implied, by 
the natural law.  In considering this question, we will analyze to specific rights commonly 
held to be fundamental or inherent to the person by most philosophers including Maritain 
– the right to freedom and the right to life. 
 
 
Freedom and Life as Natural Rights 
 
H.L.A. Hart is his essay Are There Any Natural Rights? holds “[t]he assertion of 
general rights directly invokes the principle that all men equally have the right to be 
free.”59 Hart holds this right to be free as a moral and natural right. 60 The basis of Hart’s 
assumption of freedom as the natural right is the understanding that freedom is chosen by 
all men and is inherent, not based on relationship, nor conferred.61  
Although this contention is ideal, would it be the basis for a functional human 
rights policy?  One may imagine the political jousting regarding the definition of 
freedom.  Minimally, freedom is simply the ability to determine action and movement.  
However, when viewed expansively, freedom becomes a far more nebulous word. 
Internationally, various understandings of freedom and justice exist; as well as related 
concepts of due process and rights.  From a political philosophy perspective, we wrestle 
with the determination of how human freedom is best achieved.  Does it require the link 
between the individual and collective advocated by a Marx? Or, does freedom require a 
disconnect between the individual and collective advocated Rand? 
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Mary Ann Glendon identifies this potential as rights talk which “promotes 
unrealistic expectations, heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might lead 
toward consensus, accommodation, or at least the discovery of common ground.”62 
Ultimately, in our attempt to define freedom, we are necessary left with warring language 
regarding the subjects of freedom, more particularly the state and the individual. The 
assertion of rights may serve to protect the individual from the state or, conversely, grow 
the state and limit individual rights.63 As Maritain notes, the question is of the truth 
limits. If there are no truth limits to rights except what is legislated or willed, then the 
state has practically unlimited power to define and promote rights; “a rights based 
morality in opposition to a virtue based morality and politics.”64   It is the rights based 
morality which commonly holds rights as conferred; whereas the virtue based morality is 
a product of natural law. 
The right to life, however, affords less potential for political disagreement. Life 
begets freedom. There is no more discernible common ground. Right to life serves as the 
primary right evidencing the ontological element of natural law.65 Whereas, freedom is 
fundamental, when viewed from a positive rights approach, it is conferred as a social 
prerogative.  A right to life differs from freedom as it goes to the essence of the human 
and underlying natural law. There is no related social prerogative absent the attenuated 
moral basis for promotion of eugenics. In addition, the right to life is based not upon 
choice or decision but a most fundamental need.66 It is here where we see the natural law 
become the moral right. It is also here where the need for Thomistic synderisis is most 
apparent. Yet, there remains no more politically charged issue today than those involving 
life questions such as abortion and euthanasia. Therefore, though life is most discernible, 
political debate remains.  However, in the context of international human rights, it is life 
which serves as the most functional right deserving protection as a negative right. 
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The Moral Right to Life 
 
Aristotle stated, “the concern for good and evil in human affairs is the basic issue 
of moral philosophy.”67 As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, even the most 
fundamental, agreed upon rights of freedom and life are not devoid of political 
interpretation.  Our attempt to define which rights should be protected as negative rights 
remains difficult.  It is in analyzing the most simplistic rights that we are led to the 
unavoidable conclusion of morality having a proper place in our determinations of both 
law and human rights. As Maritain contends, the natural law becomes the moral law.”68 
By foregoing natural law theory, we eliminate the possibility of a functional human rights 
policy as the basis of said policy, namely humans, are no longer unique. In the most 
extreme example of a socialist welfare state, human rights are suppressed into 
extinction.69 Particularly when coupled with totalitarianism, the consequences of a 
limited view of the person are historically tragic and bloody. 
This moral right shares characteristics of H.L.A. Hart’s understanding of general 
rights.  Hart’s general rights are “asserted defensively, when some unjustified 
interference is anticipated or threatened, in order to point out that the interference is 
unjustified.”70 The interference is, therefore, unjustified based merely on the 
encroachment upon the right.  Unlike conferred rights, these rights are general defensive 
rights which do not arise from the relationship of the subjects nor transaction.71 Thereby, 
satisfying standards established by Cranston, Rawls, Nagel, and Cohen. Conversely, this 
moral right pre-exists the relationship or transaction as it exists within the natural law. 
Whether it be a humanistic understanding of the natural law or Judeo-Christian, 
we must accept the truth of each individual human as unique and worthy of inherent 
rights.  “[F]undamental rights cannot be based either upon nihilism or upon any arbitrary 
or subjective value-choice which involves a revolt against fundamental philosophical 
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truth.”72 The basis of the truth of natural law, whether a polytheist Greek culture of 
Aristotle or monotheist monastic culture of Thomas Aquinas, is less relevant for 
sustainable human rights than recognition of the special place of the human with the 
world and time.  This place being above contemporary competing philosophies 
prioritizing the state or the environment. By making the moral determination that a moral 
right to life exists, we know ascribe rights as belonging or being owed to the individual. 
In keeping with Hart, “it is only when rules are conceived in this way can we speak of 
rights and wrongs as well as right and wrong actions.” 73 It is the appeal to a most basic 
understanding of morality – as life being worthy of protection – which allow for unity or 
solidarity in defending human rights. It is this “seal of solidarity”, identified by Felicien 
Rousseau, which allows the right to be effected.74 The theological question of whether 
this natural right requires an eternal law need not be addressed to ensure functional 
policy.75 
 Hart recognizes moral rights as a branch of morality seeking to determine how 
one may limit another’s freedom.76  Therefore, a moral right necessary infringes upon 
someone’s freedom.  As we remain focused on consensus and functionality, Hart’s 
argument would then seek a limited understanding of moral rights.  Therefore, by 
limiting the human rights policies of a sovereign to negative rights protecting only life 
both coercion and potential incongruity are limited. It is this limited coercion and 
incongruity which marks the morality of law.77 Ultimately, the identification of a moral 
right to life - a most limited understanding - preserves the functionality of an international 
human rights policy. 
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Moreover, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that human rights 
are “a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations”.78  Unfortunately, 
the UDHR then expansively defines human rights by employing a positive rights standard 
advocated by Jack Donnelly.  This expansive definition allows for the infusion of 
philosophical and political principles not shared by all countries and societies.  This 
creates a lack of consensus among and between countries.  This lack of consensus results 
in a decreased ability to react swiftly and appropriately to per se human right violations, 
including genocide and ethnic cleansing. 
 A more narrowly tailored understanding of human rights allows for a recognized 
consensus and greater ability for now inter-related sovereigns to do good and avoid evil.  
Given the millions of lives lost in various countries through institutionalized murder since 
the development of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a realist perspective 
regarding human rights is appropriate.  A limited definition of human rights based on a 
negative rights approach to protecting the moral right to life is necessary to ensure 
recognized consensus and limit future atrocity. This standard may not serve as a perfect 
normative theory.  However, the functionality of this approach far outweighs - in human 
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